Genealogy of Difference. The Discontinuities of Postmodern Thought  by Negru, Teodor
 Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  71 ( 2013 )  131 – 140 
1877-0428 © 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
Selection and peer-review under responsibility of Claudiu Mesaros (West University of Timisoara, Romania).
doi: 10.1016/j.sbspro.2013.01.018 
 
International Workshop on the Historiography of Philosophy: Representations and Cultural 
Constructions 2012 
Genealogy of difference. The discontinuities of postmodern 
thought 
Teodor Negru* 
Faculty of Philosophy and Social Political- University of Iasi, Blv. Carol I 11, Iasi, 700506, Romania  
Abstract 
According to the classical approaches of difference, on one hand, the origin of the discourse of difference was found in a new 
way of thinking that pursued the overcoming of metaphysics (Vattimo), and on the other hand, the discourse of difference was 
construed as another version of the problem of the One and the Many, which has remained a constant throughout the history 
of thinking (Laruelle). However, the post-metaphysical approaches to difference can be legitimated neither by understanding 
them as an absolutely new discourse with no relation to the previous philosophical conceptions, nor by reducing them to a 
classical problem of philosophy. The unilaterality of such conceptions can be cancelled by understanding difference as a new 
answer to a philosophical problem that preoccupied Western thinking ever since the Ancient times. Such an approach to 
unfolding of ideas as being 
marked by discontinuities. From this point of view, the post-metaphysical theories of difference (Heidegger, Derrida, 
Deleuze) should be understood starting from the discontinuities between the old discourse of metaphysics where difference is 
subordinate to identity and the new space of thinking open after the acceptance of multiplicity as an essential characteristic of 
the Being. 
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1. Preliminaries to a genealogy of difference  
The importance of understanding the idea of difference for contemporary thinking relies on the fact that, 
besides its explicit approaches, in the post-structuralist theories, e.g. Derrida, Deleuze, Lyotard, as well as in their 
(Heidegger, Nietzsche), it can be found implicitly in nowadays thinking which values 
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positively alterity, multiplicity, and diversity. In this context, one can speak about a philosophy of difference as a 
dominant of contemporary thinking without understanding by this the existence of a unique discourse of 
difference, but rather the proliferation of discourses engaging explicitly or implicitly the idea of difference. 
The ubiquity of difference in contemporary thinking has generated debates regarding the origin and the 
evolution of the idea of difference in Western thinking. The genealogy of the idea of difference has developed in 
two ways: on one hand, the origin of the discourse of difference was found in a new way of thinking that pursued 
the overcoming of metaphysics. On the other hand, the discourse of difference was construed as another version 
of the problem of the One and the Many, which has remained a constant throughout the history of thinking. 
According to the former way of understanding difference, contemporary thinking relies on a non-
contradictory, non-dialectical consideration of difference, which is not envisage it as a simple contrary of 
identity [1]. Grounding thought on difference is the outcome of the end of the metaphysical thinking considered 
to have exhausted its own possibilities to unfold. Such a conception is supported by Gianni Vattimo, to whom the 
Nietzsche-Heidegger moment marked the beginning of a new way of thinking situated beyond modernity. 
Overcoming modern thinking became a necessity when it was understood as the culmination of nihilism, which 
affected Western thinking ever since the Ancient times and which was understood either as contesting highest 
values, as with Nietzsche, or as forgetfulness of the Being, as with Heidegger. Exposing the sick character of 
modern thinking was followed by the need to overcome it, but not in the sense of simply relating critically to the 
Verwindung, which implies 
remembering the metaphysical foundations while rethinking its groundings. This meant leaving behind the 
metaphysical preoccupation of searching the unique and steady ground that would lie at the base of the world 
without implying the se  (orig. ) [2]. Refusing to 
ground thought on a steadier ground becomes the mark of the era beyond modernity, which focuses on avoiding 
 being  
which by means of science and technology pursues to dominate nature  the idea of truth representing reality by 
mirroring it, or of history as absolute progress, are replaced  characterised by the 
lack of groundings. In this context, difference appears as an alternative to the compelling approach of 
metaphysics, which subordinates the multiplicity of the world to a unique supreme principle. Claiming that 
multiplicity and becoming are essential characteristics of the world by theorizing the will of power and the 
Eternal Recurrence, as Nietzsche did, and conducting the exposure of the metaphysical groundings in the name of 
remembering the difference between Being and beings, as Heidegger did, created the framework favoring a 
horizon of thinking where the steady structure of the world was replaced by the play of difference as principle of 
multiplicity and perspectivism. Yet, this opening led to a radicalisation of the discourse of difference with the 
post-structuralist thinkers who wished to liberate thinking from any metaphysical residue. For this purpose, 
reached new wordings of difference that, are in fact hiding some themes of classical metaphysics [3]. 
Consequently, to Vattimo, post-structuralist philosophy of difference is the thinking of the forgetfulness of 
difference returning to the metaphysical way of thought either by celebrating archi-structure (Derrida) as 
referential of the classical idea of eternity, or by proclaiming the primacy of simulacrum over reality (Deleuze) as 
continuatio  From this perspective, the post-structuralist thinking of difference 
moves away from the initial intention of grounding a post-metaphysical thinking (Heidegger and Nietzsche).   
The latter modality of approaching difference considers difference to play an important role in classical 
metaphysics, within the debates on the relation between unity and multiplicity. In this case, difference does not 
imply a detachment from the metaphysical way of thinking as it justifies itself by its relation with identity. This 
idea is supported by François Laruelle [4]
of contemporary authors origin
represents a repetition of the philosophical problem of the One and the Multiplicity that was present in the 
Western thinking ever since the Ancient era. Difference appears as a general syntax and a concrete, invariant 
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 [4], i.e., as a modality to articulate the philosophical language acting as a concrete principle both at the 
formal and at the content level, thus generating a philosophical discourse centred on category, such as 
Contradiction, Existence, and Structure. Although Laruelle considers difference to be syntax and a way of 
understanding the real (as multiplicity) common to some authors, such as Heidegger, Nietzsche, Derrida or 
Deleuze, he claims the irreducibility of the approaches of difference and the impossibility to subordinate them to 
a unique theory. Each of the theorisations of difference is irreducible, which renders the post-structuralist 
discourse of difference heterogeneous, made of a mixture of theories and practices of understanding multiplicity. 
As a continuation of the Greco-Occidental problem of the relation between the One and the Multiplicity, 
difference provides an answer to the problem of the unity of the contraries that has been left unsolved throughout 
the history of Western thinking. Therefore, difference is an alternative to the answer represented by Dialectics 
regarding the surpassing of the contraries within a totalising unity. The role of difference is to cancel any attempt 
to render uniform the contraries by destroying the classical metaphysics idea of unity in all its forms: presence, 
identity, and representation. Notwithstanding, difference provides another experience to the One where the 
relation among the contraries is not described in terms of subordination with a view to creating a unity but in 
terms of mutual intertwining [4]. Difference turns into a transcendence which includes the contraries and which 
makes no longer possible the existence of exteriority that the contraries ought to surpass in order to reach one 
another. Thus, unity becomes transcendent and the One becomes a condition, be it tacit, of the possibility of 
thinking the difference. Consequently, the discourse of difference does nothing but leave the essence of the One 
undetermined, the One becoming thus the transcendent condition of difference. 
According to these attempts to explain the emergence of the idea of difference in contemporary thinking, this 
idea is a mark of discourse that contested the grounding of the being on identity and the search for the unity of 
the word. However, these approaches, which either relate difference to an anti-metaphysical intention or consider 
it a repetition of a classical metaphysical theme, failed to understand the current discourses of difference from the 
perspective of the dialogue with the Western philosophical tradition. Therefore, the post-metaphysical 
approaches of difference can be legitimated neither by understanding them as an absolutely new discourse with 
no relation whatsoever with the previous philosophical conceptions, nor by reducing them to a classical problem 
of philosophy. The unilaterality of such conceptions can be cancelled by understanding difference as a new 
answer to a philosophical problem that preoccupied Western thinking ever since the Ancient times. 
no longer is to be approached by delimiting certain periods characterised by a set of similar ideas having a 
common origin. According to Blumenberg, concepts and theories represent answers to questions arising from 
needs that have become conspicuous at a certain time in history. History is made of the plurality of these answers 
that try to offer solutions to a cons
can be understood as answers to identical questions [5]. Therefore, we should not look for radical beginnings in 
history, as the total detachment from old theories that could be used to mark the limits of historical eras, but we 
should understand the unfolding of ideas as being marked by discontinuities. This means that as theories reach 
contradictions that cannot be solved they are replaced by other theories that may provide answers to new 
requirements. The transition from one stage to the othe  often takes 
place without being noticed. All one could ascertain is the existence of a threshold marking the transition from 
the old theory to the new one without any intermediate step. From the perspective of this way of conceiving the 
history of ideas, the proliferation of the current theories of difference represents an answer to the old problem of 
the unity and the multiplicity. However, this does mean that such approaches represent the continuation by other 
means of a way of thinking present ever since the beginnings of philosophy. We should rather analyse the current 
theories of difference from the perspective of the needs emerged together with the idea that the Being is not 
unitary. Therefore, the current theories of difference should be understood from the perspective of the 
discontinuities between the old discourse of metaphysics where difference is subordinate to identity and the new 
space of thinking open after the acceptance of multiplicity, as an essential characteristic of the Being.  
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In terms of the conception of the history of ideas of Blumenberg, Nietzsche and Heidegger represent the 
threshold that allows the transition to the new understanding of the world from the perspective of difference. In 
other words, their role was to reveal the ultimate consequences of classical philosophy, which gave priority to 
identity, unity, and totality, heralding the need to re-position thinking on principles other than those of the 
metaphysics of identity. This means that, on one hand, the post-structuralist conceptions represent various 
attempts to -  the thinking space that gradually frees itself from the classical philosophy bias. On the 
other hand -  is conducted in the name of overcoming thinking 
grounded on identity, leaving room for reinterpreting metaphysics from the perspective of difference. 
Consequently, grounding thinking on the play of difference implies engaging a plurality of discourses that aim at 
overcoming the philosophical tradition by relating to it differently. 
2. The end of the metaphysics of identity  
To Heidegger, understanding difference is conducted by starting from the critique of traditional metaphysics 
characterized by the forgetfulness of the Being. By searching for the understanding of the Being as a permanent 
presence, metaphysics brings being to the foreground, turning it into the grounding principle of all things. 
Approached from the perspective of permanence, being is thought in its essential features, as a foundation that 
subsists by itself as it is considered to be of divine nature. Therefore, metaphysics reveals itself as onto-theo-logy, 
as a discourse on the supreme being that is now seen as being at the origin of all things. As an ultimate and steady 
grounding of the world, the Being of being is considered to always be identical to itself. Thus, the principle of 
identity becomes the basis of Western metaphysics, cancelling the difference between the Being and being, which 
leads to the occultation of the foundation of metaphysics and to the impossibility to grasp the truth of the Being. 
The development of metaphysics construed as the history of the forgetfulness of the Being can be divided into 
three eras, each one having its own way of concealing the truth and the difference between the Being and being 
[6]. In the Ancient era (after the Presocratics), the Being was interpreted either in the Platonic sense as , i.e., 
wh  (
to presence and maintaining as consistency. The truth in this case was understood from the perspective of the 
relation of resemblance ( ) or correspondence (adaequatio) between statement and reality. In the 
following era, the Middle Ages, the Being was understood as actualitas, i.e., as reality which fulfils itself in God, 
the supreme being. Moreover, the truth was understood as starting from the Roman idea of empire, which is 
compliant with the order imposed on reality. The modern era, the last metaphysical era of forgetfulness of the 
Being, is characterised by understanding of the truth as certainty and of grounding the beings on man as subject. 
The subject knows the reality by means of its representation, i.e., by transforming it into an object. Coming the 
Being to presence is also part of this process, as the Being has to become an object subjected to representation in 
order to be thought by the subject. The end of the modern era is represented by Nietzsche, who, despite the overt 
anti-Platonism of his philosophy, continues to remain within the framework of metaphysical thinking. To 
consequences by giving consistency to becoming, by construing it as will of power and Eternal Recurrence. Thus, 
it becomes the essence of the Being. The last stage of the forgetfulness of the Being is represented by technology, 
which sets upon nature to challenge it forth immediately. The Being is no longer unconcealed, merely as 
standing-against, but -  which is to be subjected to command and 
manipulation. Thus, modern technology represents the fulfilment of the metaphysical ideal of domination over 
the entire reality. It is precisely in this radical forgetfulness of the Being that the possibility of rethinking the 
relation between man and Being appears. As, in technical thinking, which relies on modern science that 
approaches being via calculation and planning, revealing it as setting-before, the breach between man and Being 
becomes obvious. Technology is the framework (Gestell) for bringing man and Being face to face with a view to 
their mutual challenge. The framework, which constitutes the active nature of technical thinking, is the prelude of 
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the event of appropriation (Ereignis), where man and Being are to be appropriated in their essential togetherness. 
In the event of appropriation, the identity between man and the Being is thought in the Presocratic terms as 
belonging together. This is not the case for metaphysical thinking where identity is a characteristic of the Being. 
Identity in the metaphysical sense is understood as unity of a multiplicity that is ordered within a system due to a 
principle that accomplishes the synthesis of contraries. Abandoning the interpretation of identity in the sense of 
sameness becomes salient in the German idealism, which as a fulfilment of Western metaphysics, approaches 
identity as an abstract notion. 
i.e., as the -thought of what is immediately thought, without regard as yet to the thinking that thinks this 
thought apart from mediated disclosure [7]. Conceived as the universal abstract, the Being is seen as thinking 
that thinks itself and that is externalization at different stages in the history of philosophy in order to reach full 
development. Thus, it acquires a dialectical determination, because thinking, in order to reach itself, i.e., to think 
of itself must undergo the various stages of the dialectical-speculative process. Dialectics becomes thus an 
activity specific to thinking where the difference in the sense of contradiction is a necessary step in order to 
achieve unity and identity of contraries. In this way, the identity of thinking and the Being is no longer 
understood in the Presocratic sense, as with Parmenides, where the unity between the Being and thinking is given 
by sameness, as belonging together of the Being and thinking. However, to Hegel, the identity of thinking with 
the Being is understood as representation in thinking of what exists in reality. 
This means that to Heidegger, the thinking of the Being no longer assumes that Aufhebung, the dialectical 
movement whereby complete fulfilment of the Being is achieved, but a step back to the beginnings of 
metaphysics in order to remember what remained un-thought originally. The Being will no longer be thought of 
from the perspective of progressing from [8], but from the perspective of 
the relation with being. The Being is not something that is added to being for the latter to acquire existence, but it 
is unconcealed in the overwhelming of being. However, this overwhelming is not understood as the movement of 
surpassing, which has as result the unconcealing, but the two, overwhelming and unconcealing, appear together 
as mutually belonging. In other words, being is presencing means the dynamic of coming into presence, which 
makes possible what is present (being). Such thinking of difference, as perdurance of overwhelming and arrival, 
does not transform the relation between the Being and being into a relation of opposition to be surpassed via a 
dialectical movement. The connection between the Being and being is the appropriation seen as a reciprocal 
relation that is possible because of difference. Moreover, difference is not approached as the specific difference 
between the Being and being, whereby the Being is certified as a metaphysical grounding and it is transformed 
into an absolute principle that grounds all the beings. Such an approach to difference remains within the 
framework of metaphysics, not making possible the understanding of how being reaches its Being. Difference 
must be understood as what makes possible the existence of the Being and being and relate to one another in 
mutual dependence. It is not a grounding principle, it is the one that makes the Being come to presence and thus 
appear what is present. 
understanding the Being in order to overcome the metaphysical way of thinking that has concealed ever since its 
beginnings the authentic relation of man to the Being. Understanding difference as what makes possible 
understanding how the Being comes into presence and relates to being, as belonging together, represents the end 
of the grounding of the Being on the principle of identity and of its understanding as permanent presence. Thus, 
announced the beginning of a new relation to the Being, which theorizes difference as its foundation. 
3. Beyond metaphysics: Diference as différance 
According to Derrida,  critique of the metaphysics of identity was not enough to overcome this 
way of thinking.  endeavour, even if it aimed at removing the primacy of identity, which concealed 
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the authentic approach of the Being, is still within the framework of logocentric thinking, for which the world 
should be explained in terms of pairs of contraries (soul/body, thinking/matter, good/evil, being/nothingness, etc.) 
that are valued from the point of view of how they express presence. Thus, metaphysics as onto-theology presents 
itself as metaphysics of presence seeking a steady foundation that by means if its presence (or by presencing, in 
) would ground the foundation of all being. However, in Heidegger understanding the Being as 
stepping back to presencing or concealing in unconcealing fails to challenge the very presence, to the extent that 
the Being is still occupying the position of transcendental signified [9]. 
remove fully the metaphysical assumptions, metaphysics continuing thus to manifest itself, by exercising its 
dominance over language. If, as Heidegger himself admits, the language of metaphysics is inherent to our 
thinking, while he acknowledges that 
[10], it means that the ultimate interrogation as to how the Being 
manifests itself as presence should be addressed to language. The ontological difference, which Heidegger 
regarded as the end of onto-theology, becomes thus merely a temporary moment of the openness of the Being, 
insofar as it only suggests a derivation between the Being and being, between presencing and presence. 
The attack on the metaphysics of presence is to be conducted starting from deconstructing the metaphysical 
holds in language, which means challenging the way language was understood in the Western thought as 
representing speech. Against phonocentric thinking, which by valuing voice as an expression of the spontaneity 
of the signified and its immediate presence, claims that writing is secondary to speech, Derrida suggested to 
replace the term of difference with différance. The distinction between the two, gi
 is inaudible, it is not manifest in pronunciation, nor is it heard, nor as species of sensitivity, nor of the 
intelligible, marking thus the limits of speech as a form of manifestation of presence. Hence, the différance is that 
which avoids any attempt at theorizing in terms of the categories of presence as it is located beyond any onto-
theological approach, being that which actually cludes ontotheology, inscribing it and exceeding it without 
return [11]. Furthermore, replacing the difference with différance also contributes to invalidate the classical 
concept of language, seen as a closed system of signs, where the signs are presences for something absent. 
, the sign is characterized by arbitrariness and differential character. This 
means that, on the one hand, the connection between signifier and signified is not necessary, and, on the other 
hand, that the signs distinguish by their difference from other signs. If each sign acquires its place within 
language as a result of what it is not, this means that language can be regarded as a system of differences. 
However, these differences are seen as effects of the play of différance without understanding it as their origin. 
Différance is what makes differentiating possible, hence signifying, due to the double movement it implies of 
differing and deferring. These two meanings of the term différer refer to a spatial movement and a temporal one. 
Thus, on the one hand, différance refers to spacing produced by differentiating from something else, as the 
distance or interval occurring against another. On the other hand, différance implies a delay, postponement, a 
temporization, whereby the relation with presence is deferred. By différance, spacing and temporization are 
thought of together as becoming-space of time and becoming-time of space. Hence, différance insofar as it avoids 
presence, transforming the present into an interval made up of traces of differences, becomes archi-trace, archi-
writing. This means that it reflects what lies beyond the horizon of writing construed as secondary to speech. 
Différance 
as transcendent horizon of the Being, which favours the present as a dominant value. Moreover, différance, even 
 
difference, understood as a contradiction. The latter is merely a moment to be surpassed -presence 
of an ontotheological or onto-teleological synthesis [10]. Différance is precisely what avoids this totalizing 
process of the Aufhebung, it refers to what cannot be integrated and remains un-grasped in this process, implying 
the negation of a concept and then lifting it up on another level with a view to its conservation. In other words, 
différance, together with its non-synonymic substitutes, archi- archi-
pharmakon hymen can be found all over the place throughout the history of 
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philosophy, dismisses metaphysics of presence in its most concealed assumptions. Its origins should be sought in 
those authors, such as Nietzsche or Freud, who challenged the idea of subject as it has been developed in the 
modern era, by denying the primacy of consciousness as guarantee for self-presence. To Nietzsche, différance is 
theorized in terms of the play [11], which governs the entire 
world. To Freud, différance stands for the differences between the forces of breaching that make up the content 
of the unconscious. To the above, one can also add Levinas of otherness, construed as responsibility 
for the Other, who should not be assimilated to the Same, but being preserved and maintained. In all these 
attempts to undermine the metaphysics of presence, différance appears as trace, as absence of presence, of what 
can never be brought to presence. The trace is what does not refer to a concealed substratum to explain the 
emergence of meaning, but it opens the chain of differences whereby the sign acquires meaning. Hence, it 
cancels the idea of the presence of meaning, as simulacrum of presence signifies the sign by means of 
a network of traces. The trace is the one which does not depend on any sensible plenitude, audible or visible, 
[9], but that makes all these realities possible. It is that which transcends all binary contraries 
of classical metaphysics, without giving any positive values to the poles of these contraries, but merely allows for 
these dualities to exist. Without transforming itself into a proper name meant to explain everything, as in 
metaphysics, the trace makes no longer possible the existence of any exteriority. Everything happens as a result 
of differences or alterities, and the trace as différance, by differing and deffering, makes all these intervals 
possible. 
Consequently, Derrida aims at overcoming the metaphysics of identity by reflecting on what this way of 
thinking leaves un-thought. The difference construed as différance does not cause the overthrow of a system of 
thinking, replacing a metaphysical principle with its opposite, but it makes possible the transition beyond 
traditional thinking of relating to the Being. This means that différance opens the possibility of thinking of what 
always remains outside classical metaphysics, which was based on the opposition between identity and 
difference. 
4. Difference and the metaphysics of immanence  
Understood from the perspective of the concept of difference, the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze represents a 
confrontation with traditional philosophy, which is challenged as it approached difference from the perspective of 
transcendence. The problem of theorizing, throughout the history of philosophy, of an inappropriate concept of 
difference that generated philosophical unsolvable problems, as the problem of univocity of the Being within a 
for a philosophy of transcendence against immanence. The secundarity of immanence appears in all those 
philosophical doctrines, starting with Plato and continuing with Mediaeval Christian philosophy, and then with 
modern philosophy until phenomenology, which theorized what is beyond the field of experience under the name 
of One, God, Subject, Ego, Other, etc. Without seeing the multiple theorizations of transcendence as being 
connected within a dialectical movement, Deleuze shows that in the modern era one has reached a theorization of 
the transcendence within the immanent, and it is from immanence that a breach is [12]. Placing 
transcendence in immanence is a sign of the exhaustion of metaphysical transcendence, which opens the 
possibility for metaphysics to be rethought from the perspective of immanence. This does not mean that 
metaphysics should be overcome via a critique of its assumptions in order to discover its un-thought substrate, as 
with Derrida or Heidegger. Rather, metaphysics should be reconsidered from the perspective of immanence, 
starting from a new approach of difference, which in the metaphysics of transcendence, was subordinate to 
identity. 
In the transcendence approach of difference, as it was conducted starting with Plato and continuing with 
Aristotle, Leibniz or Hegel, difference is construed as a relation with something from outside, being considered 
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of Absolute Good, the one who is at the top of the hierarchy of Ideas. Thus, the platonic difference is construed 
as a final difference, which can only grasp the differences of degrees, without being able to provide a necessary 
grounding to the Being. Aristotle distinguished between common or proper (communis or propria) difference 
where the relation of contrariety is conveyed by accidental elements, and specific difference, where contrariety 
refers to the essence of objects. The specific difference plays the role of a formal cause, meaning that it is a 
predicate applying to the genus, in order to form the species. Thus, the Aristotelian difference still remains an 
exterior difference as it is a predicate that requires relating to an exterior concept. Leibniz introduces the idea of 
infinitesimal difference, engaging the concept of infinite in understanding the difference. Difference appears both 
at the level of the small infinite, as difference of monads regarded as autonomous, and in the large infinite, as 
differentiating the things or possible worlds. However, although Leibniz succeeds in offering a different 
explanation for difference, starting from the infinite and not from the abstract opposition of contraries, he 
grounds the difference on the principle of sufficient reason, thus reducing it to identity. Hegel returns to the 
Aristotelian conception of difference as opposition of contraries, taking the idea of difference, as an exterior 
relation, to the last consequences. Difference is understood from the perspective of dialectical movement that 
characterizes the Being, as a contradiction affecting all things, to the extent that the thing differs from itself 
because it differs first from everything it is not [13]. Difference displays thus a double hypostasis: on one hand, 
-denial, with a view to its self-determination, and, on the other hand, as an 
irreconcilable contradiction to be surpassed on another level, by synthesis. In both instances, difference cannot be 
thought without an exterior determination, and, furthermore, it is thought in the abstract terms of dialectics that 
have no relation with reality whatsoever. Thus, the dialectic of Hegelian contradiction cannot grasp any 
differences of degree, or form, being considered an abstract difference. 
Against the concept of difference as exteriority, Deleuze would oppose difference as theorized by Bergson, 
e.g. internal difference. In this case, difference is no longer seen as the external contradiction between opposite 
things or qualities, but as the result of internal dynamics of the Being, which implies a movement of 
differentiation from self. The drive of this movement is the élan vital, which, as the essence of life, is what 
generates the different forms of life by means of differentiation. It is the process of differentiation that, by 
dissociation and dichotomy, actualizes the virtual in divergent lines, creating the multiplicity of living beings in 
the world. Differentiation is thus an immanent force, which does not determine an object from the outside, as 
causality does be it final or formal, but it is the action producing actualizing lines, which belong to the same 
totality that is life. Nor is it a moment of negativity that is to be surpassed, but it is 
[14].   
Bergson's conception of difference  a theory of difference that is not 
subject to the identity, as it was construed from the point of view of contradiction and negativity. Deleuze shows 
that such a theory, which detaches from the framework of the principle of identity, cannot be achieved without 
shifting from the understanding of the Being, characterized by unity, to the understanding of the Being as 
multiplicity. This transition comprised three stages: first, the Being was univocal and neutral (Duns Scotus), then, 
via Spinoza, the Being surpasses the stage of indifference, identifying itself with nature, thus becoming an 
object of pure affirmation [15]. However, the Being thus understood, is conceived as independent from modes, 
without providing their direct understanding and the understanding of the differences that individualize them. 
Therefore, the last step in the thinking of the Being as multiplicity was done by Nietzsche who theorized the will 
of power as permanent becoming, which denies any identity, and the Eternal Recurrence as the Being of such 
becoming, as identity that is subject to difference, by thinking the Same starting from Different. Hence, the 
Eternal Recurrence is the repetition of difference and its selection, to the extent that it is not the Whole, the 
Same or the prior identity in general which returns [...] Only the extreme, the excessive, returns; that which 
passes into something else and becomes identical [15]. Therefore, the Eternal Recurrence, as repetition implying 
the dissolution of prior identities, is regarded as the full accomplishment of the Being, in its univocity. To 
Deleuze, admitting the multiplicity of the Being means that we should no longer consider this multiplicity as 
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constituting itself in a unity. Conversely, the multiplicity should be regarded as free from any organization that 
would lead it to forming a totality. Thus, the world appears to be made of a variety of multiplicities, because 
everything is a multiplicity in so far as it incarnates an Idea [15]. The Idea, in this case, is not the Platonic Idea 
subsuming multiplicity, but it represents a pure multiplicity, which consists of differential elements, as well as the 
differential relations between these elements, which are not subordinated to any identity. In other words, Ideas 
have a virtual content, which is actualized by determining the differential relations that constitute them in order to 
take the form of distinct species. In this process, it is necessary to distinguish between differentiation, which 
implies determining the virtual content of the Idea, and differenciation which means the actualisation of that 
virtuality into species and distinguished parts [15]. If differentiation refers to determining the content of the 
Idea, differenciation is the process of actualizing the virtual, which corresponds to finding a solution in a certain 
context. Together, the two form the notion of different/ciation, which grasps the integrality of the object 
construed as being made up of a virtual part and an actual one. From the perspective of these distinctions, one 
should consider two explanations: on one hand, the idea of differentiation does not include the idea of negativity, 
nor does differenciation. If differentiation is pure positivity, which excludes any negative determination, 
differenciation refers to the production of actualities in the virtual domain. Thus, the negative does not appear to 
be at the origins of the process of differentiation, and of difference, but it is rather derived and separate from the 
process of actualization. On the other hand, actualizing the virtual does not imply identity. As what is actualised 
does not resemble the virtual actual terms never resemble the singularities they incarnate [15]. Hence, 
differentiation, by producing divergent lines that do not resemble the virtual multiplicity, is in fact a process of 
creation. Actualizing the Idea is due to the dynamic processes, which dramatise the Idea. This means that 
actualization creates a space, according to differential relations, which manifests itself as both interior space and 
exterior extension. In addition, actualization has a temporal dimension, manifested in the times of differentiation, 
which forms differential rhythms playing different roles in actualizing the Idea. And last but not least, actualizing 
also requires consciousness that generates spatial-temporal dynamisms and that itself traces directions, doubles 
movements and migrations, and is born on the threshold of the condensed singularities of the body or object 
whose consciousness it is [15]. This means that dramatizing the Idea actually is the differentiation of the object 
by determining the extension, duration, and quality. Thus, actualizing the Idea implies the differentiation 
occurring both at the qualitative level, via the differential relations contained in the Idea, and at the quantitative 
level due to the singularities in the Idea.  approach to difference continues with its analysis at 
the sensible level, which manifests as intensity. Intensity is considered to be difference revealing the qualitative 
content of quantity. Intensity requires development within extension, within an extensity of qualities. Difference 
as intensity tends to cancel itself in this development and to homogenise. From the perspective of the relation 
with difference, intensity is seen as having three characteristics: it includes quantitative difference, which cannot 
be cancelled in the difference of quantity; including inequality, it asserts difference and does not transform it into 
a moment of negativity; and thirdly, it appears as implied difference, which does not require a connection with 
something from the outside. Intensity is what determines the process of actualization; by means of intensity, the 
dramatisation of spatial-temporal dynamisms determines the actualization of qualities. Thus, intensity 
individualises qualities and actualizes the potentiality of the virtual while ensuring the integration and 
communication of differential elements. Hence, intensity is the one that produces, by differentiation, quality and 
extensions, representing the being of the sensible where different relates to different. 
Consequently, Deleuze, by theorizing the Being as immanence and difference as the basis of this immanent 
Being, relates to metaphysics in the sense of retrieving and not overcoming it. Theorizing difference as internal 
difference does not merely imply a critique of previous concepts, which subordinated the difference to identity, 
but also a reconstruction of metaphysics on other principles. In this way, difference is used against the 
metaphysics of identity with the intention to continue the metaphysical discourse from the perspective of the 
multiplicity of the Being.  
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5. Conclusion 
What one can draw from analysing contemporary discourses of difference is that difference represents a break 
from the old discourse of metaphysics, which would prioritise identity, implying the subordination of reality to a 
transcendent totality that homogenises the diversity of the empirical world. Notwithstanding, this does not mean 
that the discourse of difference is the continuation of an anti-metaphysical attitude, characterised by a set of 
common ideas that would dominate the current thinking. Similarly, difference should not be understood from the 
perspective of the reversal of logic present in the Western thinking ever since its beginnings. Such approaches do 
nothing but understand the current theories of difference from a unilateral perspective, without taking into 
account the discontinuities inherent to the history of ideas. 
The discourse of difference is anti-metaphysical in that it is directed against the metaphysics of identity. From 
this perspective, difference as it is currently theorised in philosophical thinking, differs from the difference, as it 
was understood in classical metaphysics. The latter, in its various approaches, i.e., Plato, Aristotle, and Hegel, is 
subjected to identity, expressed in different ways: One, genus, synthesis of contraries. 
What characterises the current difference is not its anti-metaphysical character, insofar as difference is used, in 
some versions, to reconstruct metaphysics (Deleuze), but the understanding of the Being as multiplicity. This 
reversal was initiated by the anti-Platonism of Nietzsche, who, by theorising the will of power, grounded the 
world on becoming, and then it was carried on by Heidegger, who explicitly theorised difference as an authentic 
way of understanding the groundings of the Being. In the terms of Blumenberg, Nietzsche and Heidegger are the 
threshold that marks the end of the metaphysics  of the difference 
approached as the grounding of the multiplicity of the Being. Consequently, subsequent versions of theorizing 
difference are answers to the new questions raised at the time the unitary character of being was abandoned.  
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